Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes)
Volume 43

Number 1

Article 8

Spring 2000

Why Continental Jurists Should Consult Their Transatlantic
Colleagues
Mathias Reimann
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes

Recommended Citation
Mathias Reimann, Why Continental Jurists Should Consult Their Transatlantic Colleagues, 43 Law
Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes) - (2000).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes/vol43/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes) by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

-

BY MATHIAS REIMANN, LL.M.
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continental jurists should consult
their transatlantic colleagues
The idea of codification has proved to be
amazingly resilient. In its modern form, it
was originally the child of the 18th century
marriage between the law of reason and
enlightened absolutism. It was adopted and
refined by 19th century conceptual
jurisprudence, liberalism, and republicanism.
It survived even the 20th century with its
mass democracy and totalitarian regimes,
social and regulatory state, and consumer
society. Thus, there is every reason to believe
that it will be with us in the 21st century as
well. This is particularly true in continental
Europe. In most countries there, the
traditional civil codes have remained in
force, often for 100 years or more. In other
lands, notably in eastern Europe after the fall
of communism, they are being revived. In yet
others, such as the Netherlands, they are
being replaced by completely new texts.

Recently, the idea of codification has
taken on a new dimension - that of a
European civil code. Twice in the last
decade, the European parliament has
urged the European Union member
states to undertake the codification of
private law on a European level. In
response, scholars have held conferences,
launched preparatory research projects,
and hotly debated the necessity,
feasibility, prudence, and timeliness of
such a project.
It is not my point here to take sides in
this learned and often emotional debate.
My agenda is much more modest. I want
to urge my European fellow jurists
working toward a common civil code to
consult and cooperate with scholars from
other parts of the world, notably from
North America.
Such a suggestion may seem
completely wrongheaded to many
Europeans and probably even to many
Americans. What can continental jurists
possibly learn about codification, they
will ask, from lawyers across the
Atlantic? After all, codification is an
eminently continental European
tradition. In fact, it is one of the very
hallmarks of the civil law, not of the
common law. Technically, the civilians
have all the expertise in the world, and
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politically, the desirability of a common
code is Europe's own business. It would
seem that North American codifiers
might seek European advice, but not
vice versa.
Much of this is true, but I remain
convinced that the continental jurists will
need all the help they can get, even from
their transatlantic colleagues. In planning
and drafting a common civil code,
continental jurists will run into a
panoply of difficulties. With regard to
many obstacles, such as a linguistic
situation of Babylonic dimensions,
national pride in indigenous codes, and
clashing cultural predilections, North
American lawyers will indeed have little
to offer. Yet, with regard to at least two
other problems, they will have something
to contribute.

EPluribus Unum
The first problematic issue is that
codifying European private law requires
forging a general set of concepts and
rules from a considerable variety of
individual subsets. Even if one believes
that European private law is ultimately
all rooted in the same tradition (for
example, that of the ius commune) and
thus cut from the same cloth,
codification is a daunting challenge.
It is also a challenge regarding which
American lawyers currently have greater
expertise than the Europeans. Most
European nation states succeeded in
unifying their private law in the 19th
century and could therefore rest on their
laurels in the 20th century, at least until
very recently As a result, the present
generation of European jurists views
unification of law in a federal system as a
new challenge. In contrast, their
American colleagues have never
completely unified their private law, but
have continued to face its diversity to the
present day But particularly in our
century, Americans have also made great
efforts to reach greater uniformity Thus,
84
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for American lawyers, unification of
private law has been an ongoing process
during which they have gathered vast
amounts of experience.
Over the last 100 years, the National
Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws has performed
exactly the task described above:
Condensing the various state laws into a
uniform set of concepts and rules to be
applied in all member states. In some
instances, notably the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.), these efforts
have been splendidly successful; in
others, success has been more limited or
entirely wanting. Overall, unification of
private law through uniform (model)
legislation, often covering entire areas
and thus approaching codification, has
become a firmly established tradition and
a routinely performed practice in 20th
century American legal culture.
For about three-quarters of a century,
the American Law Institute (ALI) has
been creating Restatements of Law. Again,
the task is similar to what would be
required in Europe (creating a uniform
text of law). Like the Uniform Laws,
some of these Restatements have been
highly effective in promoting national
uniformity, others have been widely
followed only as to individual sections,
and still others have had relatively little
influence. Be that as it may, the fact that
a third generation of Restatements is
currently underway proves that the work
of the ALI also has become an integral
part of the American legal system.
To be sure, there are significant, and
obvious, differences between these
American unification efforts and a
European civil code. The uniform laws,
including the U.C.C., are not true codes
in the European sense because they do
not aspire to create a comprehensive
logical order. The restatements are not
legislation to begin with, and thus bind
nobody, except by persuasion. Neither
uniform laws nor restatements are
designed as closed systems, the gaps of

which can be filled by extrapolation from
the overall framewOllk. Nor are they
considered the unquestioned centerpieces
of the private law universe. Thus, simply
copying such endeavors for Europe is out
of the question. Nonetheless, European
jurists could learn a lot from these
American projects, with regard to both
their successes and their failures.
To begin with, they can study how to
organize and manage an institution
performing such tasks, how to process
information, how to run the drafting
process, how to deal with lobbies, and
how to persuade legislators to endorse
the final product. It is true that the
Europeans have some of their own
models, such as the Hague Conference
on Private International Law, UNIDROIT,
and, more recently, the Lando Commission.
While these models will be useful when
the time comes to draft a European civil
code, the American institutions offer
great opportunities for additional
guidance. This is particularly true
because they are superior to the
European models in size, complexity,
output, and practical success, perhaps
with the exception of the Hague
Conference.
Perhaps even more importantly, the
Europeans can learn much about the
advantages and disadvantages of different
roads to legal uniformity Observing the
American experience, they can compare
the proffering of mere model laws
(the adoption of which is then left to the
member states) or non-binding
restatements with the imposition of
uniform (federal or European) law in
statutory form by a central government.
They can also see that despite a common
text, legal developments in the individual
jurisdictions will tend to diverge so that
an institutional watchdog to curb these
tendencies is indispensable. They can
observe the perpetual need for revision
and updating and thus come to realize
that the maintenance of a uniform code
is a constant, never-ending process. They

It is difficult, perhaps
impossible, for an outsider to
judge how successful
Louisiana's codifiers have been
in integrating common-law
ideas with the civilian heritage
of their state. But success or
failure is not my point here.
It is rather that their scholars
have become sophisticated in
codifying law in a civil and
common-law environment and
that such sophistication is a
rare and precious commodity
from which the Europeans
should try to benefit.
Codifiers from Louisiana and
Quebec are uniquely qualified to
assist their European colleagues
in bridging the Channel.
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can also learn something about how
much private-law uniformity one really
needs in a common market, and they can
get a sense of how much one can hope to
achieve despite the centrifugal forces
inherent in any federation. Last, but not
least, they can gauge the merits of
gradual development and careful
experimentation, which are the strengths
of American federalism, and weigh them
against the resulting inconsistency and
incoherence that are its weaknesses.

Codification in Mixed Legal Systems
The second difficulty arises because a
truly European civil code would have to
include the common law. Of course, the
continental jurists could simply limit
their endeavor to their own civil law
systems, but that would deliver a
devastating blow to European legal
integration. Leaving out the common law
is thus not a viable option. Yet, if forging
one system of rules out of more than a
dozen continental subsystems is
challenging, including the law of
England and Ireland is an even more
formidable task. It is a banality that the
differences among the civilian
jurisdictions are less significant than the
differences between these civilian systems
and the common law. In the world of
law, the [English] Channel is still a divide
that is not easily overcome.
This is particularly true in several
respects pertaining to codification. First,
there are important divergences between
continental civil law and (English, Irish,
and, to some extent, Scottish) common
law in the fabric of private law itself.
Even if one were to accept that the
substantive discrepancies between the
civil and the common law have been
overrated and that the systems have been
converging, there remain indisputable
disparities regarding the respective
conceptual tools and general structures.
The civilian systems share much of the
logical framework developed by
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continental scholars since the late Middle
Ages and can easily use it as a foundation
when codifying private law. The common
law system lawyers have never fully
committed themselves to any
comprehensive and systematic order Hale, Blackstone, and the analytical
jurists notwithstanding. A second
difficulty lies in the divergent
conceptions of legal rules. Civilians
conceive of rules broadly and are
comfortable with a high level of
abstraction, which facilitates codification.
Common lawyers construe them
narrowly and always with a view to the
concrete facts that generated them in the
first place - an approach almost
antithetical to the succinct and general
rules of which the traditional civil codes
have consisted. Finally, civil lawyers have
practiced and cherished codification for
centuries; they can thus embrace it on an
all-European level as well. Common
lawyers, especially in England, have
traditionally been skeptical, if not
outright hostile , to the whole idea; it is
hard to believe that they will suddenly
embrace it simply because it now
concerns not only their own law, but also
that of Europe in general. Significantly,
the common lawyers have by and large
not participated in the current debate
about a European civil code.
With regard to all these differences
and the concomitant difficulties, it seems
that jurists from the other side of the
Atlantic are not exactly a promising
source of help. Private law in the United
States is even more confused and chaotic
than its English counterpart. American
lawyers construe rules just as narrowly
and consider them just as fact -dependent
as do their English colleagues. It is true
that jurists in the United States are less
hostile to codes, but even they have
tended to shy away from , or, as in the
case of California, to disregard
comprehensive private-law codification
in the European style. They have mostly
preferred a piecemeal approach, leaving
huge gaps. For these reasons, the vast
majority of Americans could indeed offer

little help to European codifiers in
dealing with the frictions between the
civilian and the common-law
approaches.
Yet there is a small group of North
American lawyers who could be
extremely useful in exactly this regard.
They are the civilian jurists from the
mixed jurisdictions, i.e., from Louisiana
and Quebec. Just like the advocates and
the future draftsmen of a European code,
they are civilians by training and at heart
who, nonetheless, keep a constant eye on
the common law. Operating in civilian
enclaves surrounded by a common-law
world , they are by necessity experts in
working on the fault lines between the
two great traditions. They also have a
quality that lawyers from most other
so-called mixed jurisdictions, such as
Scotland, South Africa, and Israel, lack,
but that is vital in the present context they have ample experience with civil
codes. Both Louisiana and Quebec have
long and proud traditions of codification.
These traditions are alive and well.
Recently, Louisiana thoroughly revised its
civil code, while Quebec enacted a
completely new one. Through their
traditions, both jurisdictions have
produced a group of experts who do
essentially what the Europeans are now
planning to do: Codifying private law in
a mixed jurisdiction in which the civil
law predominates. The common law
must receive its due , and the rules must
be compatible with both traditions.
Illustrations of how civilians in these
mixed systems have worked toward the
goal of bringing civil and common law
together are not hard to find; Louisiana
can provide some examples. Codifiers in
the Bayou State have always worked
comparatively. Leading representatives
are Athanassios Yiannopoulos, mainly in
property law, Saul Litvinoff in
obligations, and , more recently, Symeon
Symeonides in conflict of law. In drafting
and revising rules, they and others have
constantly considered concepts, rules,

and approaches from various civil- and
common-law jurisdictions. The Louisiana
Law Institute, home of much of their
work, has become a veritable powerhouse
of comparative legislative drafting.
As a result of these comparative
efforts, Louisiana's civil law today shows
many signs of imports from common-law
jurisdictions. Some of these imports have
affected the law of obligations. There we
find the common-law concept of
detrimental reliance, common-law
notions on the determination of price
and the transfer of risk in sales law that
accords with other states, and, outside
the code, common-law ideas about the
conditional sale of movables. Other
Anglo-American -ideas have influenced
the law of property. The new concept of
"Building Restrictions" is curiously
reminiscent of covenants running with
the land at common law; the "transfer of
rights to a thing" incorporates the AngloAmerican quitclaim deed in thin
disguise, and, again outside the civil
code, the trust - one of the very
hallmarks of the common law - was
incorporated into Louisiana law.
Particularly with regard to trusts, the
common-law import was modified and
adjusted to fit into the surrounding civillaw environment.
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, for
an outsider to judge how successful
Louisianas codifiers have been in
integrating common-law ideas with the
civilian heritage of their state. But success
or failure is not my point here. It is
rather that their scholars have become
sophisticated in codifying law in a civil
and common-law environment and that
such sophistication is a rare and precious
commodity from which the Europeans
should try to benefit. Codifiers from
Louisiana and Quebec are uniquely
qualified to assist their European
colleagues in bridging the Channel.

Looking Beyond European Shores
If the European jurists are well advised to
draw on the experience of their
transatlantic colleagues with codification
in federal systems and mixed
jurisdictions, how can they do so? Most
importantly, the continental civilians
should stop talking just among
themselves. Europeans like to chastise
American lawyers for their parochialism,
and often for good reason. In the debate
about a common civil code, however, the
Europeans have been the parochial ones.
It is time they look beyond their shores
and consult outsiders as well.
Currently, at the discussion stage, they
should actively seek the views and advice
of lawyers from the United States,
especially from Louisiana, and also from
Quebec. They should invite them to their
conferences and workshops and ask
them how they have handled the
difficulties of codification. How did they
know whether the time was right to
undertake a codification project? How
did they prepare for it, and on what
sources did they primarily draw? To what
extent was the work of legal experts
affected by political considerations and

alliances? Where did their efforts succeed,
and where did they faiL? What were the
reasons for their successes and failures? If
the Europeans proceed to the drafting
stage, they should appoint leading
members of the National Conference of
Commissions on Uniform Laws and of the
American Law Institute, and particularly
codifiers from Louisiana and Quebec, as
members of the respective committees in
an advisory function. It is likely that those
asked would be glad to serve.
Involving especially the jurists from
Louisiana and Quebec means enlisting
lawyers with first-rate expertise in
comparative law in action. These scholars
have gone beyond just thinking about
codifying rules in mixed jurisdictions they have actually done it. Their products
are enacted in the legislatures and are
being enforced in the courts. An added
bonus is that in several cases, these
scholars were born, raised, and educated
in Europe. They are thoroughly familiar
with its languages, traditions, cultural
diversity, and with the European legal
mind. What better outside help could
European codifiers want?
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